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Money Spending or Money
Laundering: The Fine Line
between Legal and Illegal
Financial Transactions
Matthew R. Auten*
I.

Introduction

The essence of “[m]oney laundering is the process of
changing money gained from illegal operations into a
manageable form while concealing its illicit origins.”1 “Money
laundering” is a relatively new term,2 as is the notion that
money laundering is a crime.3 In 1986, the United States
criminalized money laundering with passage of the Money
Laundering Control Act.4 The new law reflected Congress’s
desire to punish individuals whose financial activities
concealed the existence, size, and scope of major drug
smuggling and organized crime rings.5 When money laundering
* J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law (2013); B.A., McGill
University (2002). The Author wishes to thank his wife Meghan, his parents
Don and Judy Auten, and the entire Purvis family (including Robby and Max)
for their boundless love, support, and patience, and the faculty and staff of
Pace Law School for the commitment to excellence in education.
1. STAFF OF S. CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, 100TH CONG.,
LEGISLATION AIMED AT COMBATING INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING AND
MONEY LAUNDERING 13 (Comm. Print 1987).
2. The term “money laundering” was apparently coined by United States
law enforcement officials and entered the popular lexicon during the
Watergate scandal in the mid-1970s. WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO COUNTER MONEY LAUNDERING
AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 20 (3d ed. 2004).
3. Kern Alexander, US Anti-Money Laundering Law: Background and
Overview, in BUTTERWORTH’S INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO MONEY LAUNDERING
LAW AND PRACTICE 630 (Toby Graham ed., 2d ed. 2003).
4. Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-52, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (2006)).
5. See Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and
Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 145-47 (1995).
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was criminalized, drug trafficking was considered to be the
world’s most serious crime problem.6
However, the Money Laundering Control Act did not solely
target professional money launderers.7 Instead, Congress
crafted a broad statute designed to criminalize the actions of
anyone who knowingly participated in an illicit transaction,
regardless of its magnitude or dollar value.8
Although the current money laundering statue is broad,
there is widespread agreement that it does not criminalize the
mere act of spending money generated by illegal criminal
activity.9 In other words, spending money by making a
purchase or entering into a transaction is not necessarily a
crime, even if the party spending the illegally gained money
knows that the money came from illegal activities. Rather, in
order to run afoul of the law, there must be direct or
circumstantial evidence showing that a transaction using the
illegal funds was made with an intent to “conceal or disguise
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,”10 or to
“avoid a transaction reporting requirement.”11
There is often a fine line between legal transactions that
amount to no more than money spending and illegal
transactions designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise;
and it is difficult to distinguish between the two. The issue
often boils down to how the transaction is “characterized” by a
finder of fact and whether enough evidence exists to support
the fact finder’s characterization. Put another way, the
challenge is determining whether the evidence demonstrates a
transaction was entered into with the requisite mens rea. The

6. STAFF OF S. CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
8. 132 CONG. REC. 3827 (1986).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017, 1022 (8th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v.
Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525,
538-39 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 120 (2d
Cir. 1999); United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1385 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir. 1991).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
11. Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).
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“characterization challenge” is compounded by the fact that
money laundering cases typically rely on circumstantial
evidence to establish that a transaction was designed with an
intent to conceal. The challenge is best exemplified by cases in
which money laundering charges are based on an underlying
transaction whose purpose, on its face, could either be to obtain
an immediate personal benefit, or to conceal some element of
the criminal nature of the funds.12
In this Article, I will examine the history of legislative
efforts to combat money laundering in the United States,
including the intent and purpose of the Money Laundering
Control Act 1986.13 I will then analyze how courts have
12. I will refer to transactions that could easily serve either a legal or
illegal purpose as “dual-purpose” transactions.
13. Within the anti-money laundering statutes, Congress has defined
two types of money laundering that are often referred to as “promotional” and
“concealment” money laundering.
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a
financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity-(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity; or (ii) with intent to
engage in conduct constituting a violation of section
7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in
whole or in part-(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting
requirement under State or Federal law,
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or
twice the value of the property , whichever is greater, or
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. For
purposes of this paragraph, a financial transaction shall be
considered to be one involving the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity if it is part of a set of parallel or dependent
transactions, any one of which involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity, and all of which are part of a
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addressed the challenge of characterizing dual-purpose
transactions by developing factors whose presence may show
that a transaction was entered into with an intent to conceal.
In addition to providing an analysis of several cases where
courts grappled with the challenges of characterizing dualpurpose transactions, I will also examine the development of a
“heightened” evidentiary standard that is often applied to
scrutinize whether sufficient evidence exits to characterize a
dual-purpose transaction as money laundering rather than
money spending. Finally, I will make recommendations for
minimizing the challenges of characterizing dual-purpose
transactions.
II. Legislative History
Money laundering is often referred to as the “lifeblood” of
organized crime, because it allows criminal enterprises to store,
transport, and spend the profits of their illegal activities, while
also concealing their existence, size, and scope from law
enforcement agencies.14 However, the act of money laundering
itself was not criminalized until passage of the Money
Laundering Control Act in 1986.15 Before that time, law
enforcement agencies still investigated money laundering,16
single plan or arrangement.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2006). Therefore, the defining characteristic of
“promotional” money laundering is an intent to facilitate the carrying on of
an unlawful activity, whereas “concealment” money laundering is
distinguished by an intent to hide the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of illegal proceeds. After the initial overview, I will focus exclusively
on issues involving “concealment” money laundering as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(B).
14. Letter from Irving R. Kaufman, Chairman, President’s Comm’n on
Organized Crime, to Honorable Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S. (1984)
(introducing PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH
CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY
LAUNDERING (1984) [hereinafter THE CASH CONNECTION]).
15. Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-52, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (2006)).
16. See, e.g., Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S.J. Res.
233: A Joint Resolution to Authorize the President’s Commission on Organized
Crime to Compel the Attendance and Testimony of Witnesses and the
Production of Information, 98th Cong. 100 (1984) (statement of Francis M.
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since the strategy of “following the money” has long been an
important law enforcement tactic,17 but before money
laundering was criminalized, the “follow the money” strategy
was only a roadmap for discovering underlying criminal
enterprises, or as evidence of tax evasion, or other regulatory
crimes.18 In fact, before money laundering itself was
criminalized, the Bank Secrecy Act, which requires banks to
report domestic currency transactions in excess of $10,000,19
was the primary statute used to charge criminals with what
would now be called money laundering.20
By the early 1980s, the size and scope of the money
laundering problem made it clear that the United States
needed new measures to close existing loopholes in the Bank
Secrecy Act.21 One goal in creating a new statutory regime was
to enable law enforcement to disrupt the money pipeline that
funded massive organized crime and drug trafficking
operations.22 Although traditional criminal activities like loansharking, illegal gambling, fraud, and bribery required money
laundering to cleanse their illicit proceeds; it was the major
drug trafficking organizations—who laundered billions of
dollars in cash—that supplied the strongest impetus for the
new money laundering law.23
As the value of the illegal drug trade grew during the
1960s and 1970s, money laundering became more lucrative and

Mullen, Jr., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration) [hereinafter
Mullen Statement].
17. R.T. NAYLOR, FOLLOW-THE-MONEY: METHODS IN CRIME CONTROL
POLICY
8-9
(1999),
available
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/nathanson/washout.html.
18. See Mullen Statement, supra note 16, at 100; Sultzer, supra note 5,
at 152.
19. Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 91–508, 84 Stat. 1114-24 (1970); see
also THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 14, at 8-9 (explaining the
shortcomings and loopholes of the Bank Secrecy Act).
20. STAFF OF S. CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, supra note 1, at 14.
21. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND
MONEY LAUNDERING 165 (1984) (containing statement of John M. Walker Jr.
to Commission).
22. See Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,723 (July 28, 1983);
STAFF OF S. CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, supra note 1, at 16.
23. THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 14, at 7; NAYLOR, supra note 17,
at 6.
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increasingly sophisticated.24 By the 1980s, the Western world
was awash in narcotics.25 Along with the rise of foreign cartels
and increasing participation by the mafia in the illegal drug
trade,26 a new class of criminal emerged: the professional
money launderer.27 These criminals, who often had a whitecollar background,28 were detached from the underlying
criminal activity that generated the operations illegal income,
and instead focused solely on the means and methods of
performing money laundering transactions.29
In response to the growing role of money laundering in
financing high-profile criminal organizations, President
Reagan formed an advisory commission to study the issue, to
recommend reforms to close existing loopholes, and to give law
enforcement new tools to cutoff the lifeblood of organized
criminal organizations.30 Through passage of the Money
Laundering Control Act, Congress took aim at those whose
financial expertise enabled criminal networks to operate
efficiently and thereby increase their profitability.31
Additionally, the new law enabled law enforcement to
strategically attack criminal organizations by targeting their
cash reserves and undermining the financing of their
operations.32 However, in approving the Money Laundering
Control Act, Congress was not merely concerned with the big
fish and financial whizzes who laundered millions of dollars.

24. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 21, at v;
Sultzer, supra note 5, at 147.
25. NAYLOR, supra note 17, at 9.
26. Id.
27. Sultzer, supra note 5, at 158; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED
CRIME, supra note 21, at 8; see also GILMORE, supra note 2, at 42.
28. Alexander, supra note 3, at 628.
29. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 21, at 80-83
(containing statement of Special Agent Edward Gillen to Commission);
Sultzer, supra note 5, at 147.
30. See Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,723 (1983); Legislation
to Grant Additional Power to the President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 7
Op. O.L.C. 128 (proposed Aug. 24, 1983).
31. Jimmy Gurule, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating
A New Federal Offense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative
Means of Punishing Specified Unlawful Activity?, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823,
825 (1995).
32. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 21,at 161.
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Rather, as one Congressman stated at the time, the goal was
to:
let the whole community, the whole population,
know they are part of the problem and they could
very well be convicted of it if they knowingly take
these funds. If we can make the drug dealers’
money worthless, then we have really struck a
chord . . . . [Y]ou have outstanding business
people who are otherwise totally moral who are
accepting these funds and profiting greatly from
drug trafficking . . . and this will put a stop to
it.33
In other words, the Money Laundering Control Act created a
net designed to catch both sharks and minnows.
III.

Distinguishing Money Laundering from Money Spending

As a result of Congress’s decision to criminalize all money
laundering, regardless of the size or scope of the transaction in
question, money laundering charges have arisen in a myriad of
different circumstances, and courts have had ample
opportunities to interpret the meaning of the statute.34 One
area of interpretation where there is widespread agreement
among courts and commentators is that the Money Laundering
Control Act did not criminalize the mere spending of money
earned through illegal means.35 However, there is often a
33. 132 CONG. REC. 3827 (1986).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2005)
(contractor fraud on gas pipeline project); United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d
530 (4th Cir. 2001) (bank employee embezzlement); United States v. Dobbs,
63 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 1995) (illegal sale of cattle); see also United States v.
Hall, 434 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2006) (personal loans, real estate purchases, and
transfers to construction company used as a front); United States v.
Marshall, 248 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2001) (Rolex watch, fine wine, and tennis
bracelet); United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994)
(land, an insurance investment, a pickup truck, and Paso Fine riding horses).
35. See United States v. Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017, 1022 (8th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Hall, 434 F.3d at
50; Marshall, 248 F.3d at 538-39; United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110,
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narrow distinction between legal financial transactions that
only evince an intent to spend the proceeds of illegal activity,
and financial transactions that are designed—in whole or in
part—to launder the money and conceal the underlying illegal
activity that generated the funds in question.
Since money laundering is not the equivalent of money
spending,36 the question for the courts was what distinguishes
one from the other? Or, put another way, what kind of evidence
can be relied upon to characterize a transaction as either
money spending or money laundering?
The characterization challenge is best illustrated through
cases where money laundering has been charged for a dualpurpose transaction. Dual-purpose transactions are especially
tricky to characterize because, objectively, they often have the
simultaneous effect of providing immediate personal benefits
and concealing or disguising the source or nature of the funds
used in the transaction.
To illustrate the characterization challenges that dualpurpose transactions pose, imagine a criminal who uses the
proceeds of his criminal acts to purchase a massive diamond
ring for his wife, acquire a car for his son, and open a bank
account in his daughter’s name. Each of these transactions
provides immediate personal benefits to the criminal and his
family members, but each could also have the effect of
laundering the proceeds of the criminal’s activities. How does a
fact-finder, prosecutor, or court determine whether the purpose
of these transactions was benevolent? When is the evidence
sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
transactions were undertaken with the requisite mens rea for
money laundering?
To determine whether sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for money laundering has been produced by the
prosecution, the most clear-cut cases rely on probative

120 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1385 (5th Cir.
1995); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991).
36. Dvorak, 617 F.3d at 1022; Law, 528 F.3d at 895-96; Hall, 434 F.3d at
50; Marshall, 248 F.3d at 538-39; Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 120; Willey, 57
F.3d at 1385; Jackson, 935 F.2d at 842; United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d
940, 946 (10th Cir. 1991).
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statements made by the defendant.37 Direct evidence of this
kind is often obtained through wiretaps,38 or through the
testimony of co-conspirators.39 However, more often than not,
the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence—often with
the interpretive help of an expert witness—to make their case
that a dual-purpose transaction should be characterized as
money laundering.40 In some instances, circumstantial
evidence may provide a clear inference that a particular dualpurpose transaction, or series of transactions, should be
characterized as money laundering, because the intent to
conceal is clear.41 For example, in cases where there is evidence
of “numerous transfers, multiple accounts, fictitious accounts,
or the use of third-parties,” before the dual-purpose purchase is
made, there is ample evidence of a defendant’s intent to conceal
and thus evidentiary support to characterize the transaction as
money laundering.42
Given the diversity of crimes that may lead to money
laundering charges, the endless ways criminals seek to launder
money, and the importance of the context in which these
actions are taken, there is no definitive list of acts that are
37. See Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 120 (“There was ample evidence that the
money in the safe deposit box was the fruit of . . . [the] drug transactions and
that Antoinette placed it there as his direction so as to conceal it. Indeed, he
was recorded saying just that . . . .”); see also Hall, 434 F.3d at 54 (“There was
testimony that Hall said that he established Fire Island Construction 'to
make him look legitimate' and that he transferred construction equipment to
Fire Island as part of a scheme to 'clean up some [of the] money.”); United
States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1410 (9th Cir. 1995) (confidential informant
asked Defendants to participate in money laundering scheme involving
casino chips that were allegedly skimmed by a casino employee); United
States v. Monea, 376 F. App’x 531, 533 (6th Cir. 2010) (Defendant told
undercover FBI agent “that he had a lot of money that he needed to move into
legitimate businesses.”) (unpublished opinion).
38. See, e.g., Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 113.
39. See, e.g., Monea, 376 F. App’x at 539.
40. See generally Thomas M. DiBiagio, Money Laundering and Drug
Trafficking: A Question of Understanding the Elements of the Crime and the
Use of Circumstantial Evidence, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 255, 272-74 (1994).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“[I]nasmuch as the money was deposited in bank accounts under false
names, and Omoruyi used false identification to withdraw it, he clearly
conducted the transactions charged with the intent to conceal or disguise the
nature, source, ownership and control of the proceeds of the mail fraud.”).
42. United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006).
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probative of an intent to “conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.”43 Nevertheless, a
number of courts have embraced a non-exhaustive list of
actions that are probative of an intent to conceal, and thus
evidence that the actions were undertaken with the necessary
mens rea for criminal money laundering.44 Perhaps the best
known and widely used list of probative factors was compiled
by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States
v. Garcia-Emanuel.45
[The factors] include, among others, statements
by a defendant probative of intent to conceal;
unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction;
structuring the transaction in a way to avoid
attention; depositing illegal profits in the bank
account of a legitimate business; highly irregular
features of the transaction; using third parties to
conceal the real owner; a series of unusual
financial moves cumulating in the transaction; or
expert testimony on practices of criminals.46
When courts are asked to decide whether a given set of
facts are sufficient to establish or sustain a charge of money
laundering, the issue is often raised by a motion made at
trial,47 although occasionally the issue is raised for the first
time on appeal.48 In either event, once the issue moves to
appeal following a conviction, the evidence must be viewed in a
light most favorable to the government, although because the
proceedings are criminal in nature, the underlying facts must
have been sufficient to establish a defendant’s guilt beyond a

43. 18 U.S.C § 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir.
2011); United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 539 (6th Cir. 2001).
45. 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994).
46. Id. at 1475-76 (internal citations omitted).
47. See, e.g., Richardson, 658 F.3d at 337.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Esterman, 324 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.
2003).
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reasonable doubt.49
IV. Approaches to Characterizing Dual-Purpose Transactions
A. The Foundational Cases
One of the first cases to address the challenge of
characterizing dual-purpose transactions was United States v.
Sanders.50 Johnny Lee Sanders was indicted for his
involvement in a heroin distribution ring, and of the forty-one
counts against him, several were for violating federal money
laundering statutes.51 Two of the money laundering charges,
which were also leveled at Sanders’s wife, stemmed from the
couple’s purchase of an automobile using the proceeds of
Johnny Lee’s illegal activities.52 The Sanders’ were convicted by
a jury at trial, but their money laundering convictions were
nullified by a post-trial motion.53 On appeal, the government
first argued that the money laundering statute should be
interpreted broadly to encompass “all transactions, however
ordinary on their face, which involve the proceeds of unlawful
activity.”54 However, the Tenth Circuit held that money
laundering was not the same as “money spending . . . .”55
As an alternative to their statutory interpretation
argument, the government also insisted that the “concealment”
requirement had been proven because the car was titled in
their daughter’s name, because the Sanders signed documents
in their daughter’s name, and because the car was paid for in
cash.56 However, the court held that despite the car being titled
in the name of a third-person,57 the fact that the Sanders’
daughter came to the car dealership after the sale, that she
shared the couple’s last name, and that the car was
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 942.
Id. at 944-45.
Id.
Id. at 946.
Id.
Id.
This was allegedly done for insurance purposes. See id.
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conspicuously used by the couple after the purchase
necessitated overturning their convictions.58 Essentially the
court found that evidence presented could not establish that
the car purchase was a means of concealing the illegal proceeds
of Johnny Lee’s criminal activities.59
In 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
revisited Sanders and the challenge of characterizing dualpurpose transactions.60 A jury convicted Mario Garcia-Emanuel
on drug, tax evasion, and money laundering charges, but he
was granted a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.
Pro. 29(c) on all money laundering charges.61 Both sides
appealed. 62 At the Court of Appeals, Garcia-Emanuel’s
conviction was reinstated on five counts of money laundering,
while a judgment of acquittal was upheld on twelve others. For
this article, the court’s handling of counts Fourteen and Fifteen
are most significant.63 Counts Fourteen and Fifteen stemmed
from two separate purchases of Paso Fino horses by GarciaEmanuel and his wife.64 The conviction based on one purchase
was reinstated, while a judgment of acquittal was affirmed on
the other.65
Garcia-Emanuel and his wife had a hobby of raising Paso
Fino horses.66 Therefore, “while a horse in some instances could
be essentially an investment, there was a significant aspect of
present personal benefit in this case.”67 The court described
these counts as “borderline cases”68 where “our requirement
that the jury verdicts of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt be
based on substantial evidence, and not mere suspicion, becomes
paramount.”69
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (10th
Cir. 1994).
61. Id. at 1472.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1477-78.
64. Id. at 1477.
65. Id. at 1477-78.
66. Id. at 1477.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1475 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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In Count Fourteen, a large payment on the horse was
made in cash and the Garcia-Emanuel’s orally represented to
the seller of the horse the cash for the purchase came from
their restaurant.70 However, evidence at trial showed that the
cash had come from illegal activities.71 To counter the inference
that these facts revealed the requisite mens rea, the GarciaEmanuels’ introduced evidence that exchanging cash for horses
was a normal practice within the trade, that the contract for
the horse was negotiated in the husband’s name, that the
restaurant was not used as a remitter or named party in the
transaction, and that no attempt was made to leave a paper
trail that would lead an investigator to believe the money came
from any source other than Garcia-Emanuel.72 Therefore, the
court held that mere facts of the all-cash purchase and a single
false comment about the source of the funds were insufficient
evidence upon which a jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the transaction could be characterized as money
laundering.73 Rather, the court found that, under the
circumstances, the all-cash transaction and single false
comment did not amount to “substantial evidence” of an intent
to conceal.74
Count Fifteen of Garcia-Emanuel’s indictment involved
nearly the same circumstances as Count Fourteen, but in this
instance the money laundering conviction was reinstated.75
Count Fifteen involved another purchase of a Paso Fino horse,
but in this transaction, Ms. Garcia-Emanuel purchased the
horse in her husband’s name using a $20,000 check drawn on
their joint checking account.76 However, in the week prior to
the purchase of the horse, three cash deposits of $7000, $8000,
and $8000 were made into the joint account.77 Although the
court noted that bank deposits structured to avoid the $10,000
currency reporting requirements are criminalized under

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1477.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1478.
Id.
Id.
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another section of the money laundering statute,78 the court
nevertheless held that the temporal proximity of the
transactions presented sufficient evidence upon which a jury
could reasonably have concluded that the horse purchase was
designed, in whole or in part, with an intent to conceal.79 The
divergent results between these two nearly identical
transactions illustrates the fine line between money laundering
and money spending.
B. Concealment in the Underlying Criminal Activity
In United States v. Dobbs and United States v. Shoff, the
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits helped to
clarify the difference between money spending and money
laundering.80 Shoff was convicted of fraud for running an
investment Ponzi scheme and of money laundering for using
proceeds from his scam to purchase two cars.81 The government
argued that “concealment–that is, not telling the victim what is
really going on–is an essential feature of all schemes to
defraud. . . . [Therefore] all schemes to defraud people of money
. . . include an element of money laundering.”82
However, the court held that although
Shoff certainly concealed [from his victims] the
fact that he was converting all their money[;] . . .
. the open manner in which he used some of the
proceeds to purchase two cars was no more
designed to help conceal this fraud than the fact
that he spent most of the rest of the proceeds at
casinos to finance his fondness for gambling.83
Therefore, the mere fact that committing a fraud necessarily

78. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
79. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d at 1478.
80. See United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 1998).
81. Shoff, 151 F.3d at 890-91.
82. Id. at 891.
83. Id.
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requires an element of concealment is not sufficient to show
that a subsequent transaction using proceeds of the fraud to
purchase personal items also evinced the same intent to
conceal.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the
same result in United States v. Dobbs.84 Dobbs was convicted of
fraud and two counts of money laundering for a scheme
involving illicit sales of cattle.85 One money laundering count
showed Dobbs deposited the proceeds of an illicit cattle sale
into his wife’s bank account and then used the account to pay
family and ranching expenses.86 The second count found that
Dobbs converted a $37,000 cattle sale check into four cashier’s
checks that were subsequently used to pay for family and
ranching expenses.87 Although the government argued that
Dobbs’s refusal to disclose these transactions to his bank and
his bankruptcy attorney was evidence of intent to conceal the
source of the funds, the court held that the evidence presented
only demonstrated Dobbs was involved in fraudulent activity,
and thereafter spent the proceeds, without the requisite
attempt to conceal that is necessary for a money laundering
conviction.88 Critically, the court noted that third-parties were
not used in this scheme, that Dobbs typically used his wife’s
bank account as the ranch’s main operational account, and that
the transactions themselves were “open and notorious—at least
as much as typical bank transactions can be.”89 Therefore, the
element of concealment from the fraud could not be “attached”
to the subsequent money spending transactions.
Two years later, in United States v. Tencer, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit clarified that their holding in
Dobbs did not stand for the proposition that money laundering
charges could be avoided in the event of a fraud just because a
criminal conducted banking transactions with the fraud
proceeds in their own name.90 Tencer was convicted of mail
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 397.
United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1130-31 (5th Cir. 1997).
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fraud and money laundering for his role in a scheme to defraud
several insurance companies.91 In the three years before being
indicted, Tencer opened numerous bank accounts across the
country using his own name.92 Once indicted, Tencer directed
those banks to transmit his funds to an address in Louisiana at
which he neither lived nor worked.93 The cashier’s checks were
then used to open a new bank account in Las Vegas, where
Tencer informed the bank employees that he was “moving into
the area and needed cash to buy a business.”94 He also directed
several banks, which had not yet mailed his deposits to
Louisiana, to wire the money to his new Las Vegas account
instead.95 Tencer then sought to have the balance of his Las
Vegas account, an amount exceeding $1,000,000, delivered to
him, in cash, at a local airport.96
On appeal, Tencer argued the evidence supporting his
money laundering convictions was insufficient because he
never used third-parties and his actions created a clear paper
trail connecting him to the bank transactions.97 The
government countered by arguing that using a false identity or
third-party is not essential to a money laundering conviction,
where other evidence clearly shows an intent to conceal.98 The

91. Id. at 1124-25.
92. Id. at 1128.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1129.
98. If a third-party or false identity is used in the course of an alleged
money laundering scheme, courts have found that evidence goes to the heart
of the statute’s intent to criminalize concealment and have been quick to
affirm convictions on those grounds. See United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d
1374, 1385 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “simply spending money in one’s
own name will generally not support a money laundering conviction, using a
third party, for example a business entity or relative, to purchase goods on
one’s behalf or from which one will benefit usually constitutes sufficient proof
of a design to conceal.”); see also United States v. Graham, 125 F. App’x 624,
631 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming conviction for conspiracy where defendant
knew drug-dealing money launderer, although physically present when a
vehicle was purchased in a third-persons name, “intentionally concealed his
own legal identity from any of the activities or documentation and concealed
that he provided the money for the down payment, trade-in, or balance
financed.”) (unpublished opinion).
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court agreed, finding Tencer’s request that funds be sent to an
address at which he neither worked nor resided, his use of a
Las Vegas bank hundreds of miles away from his home and
business to consolidate funds, and his false statements to bank
employees about his plans to move to the area were sufficient
to support his convictions.99 In addition, although the court did
not dwell on this point in its analysis, it should be noted that a
distinguishing factor between Tencer and Dobbs is that Dobbs
spent the fraudulently obtained funds for immediate personal
benefit, while Tencer evidently did not.100 Although the court
did not speculate about whether Tencer’s conviction would
have been affirmed had he used the proceeds of his illegal
activities for a dual-purpose transaction, it is safe to assume
that the existence of such evidence would have made the
decision to affirm his conviction a much closer call.
C. Two Mischaracterized Dual-Purpose Transactions
In contrast to Dobbs, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit found sufficient evidence to uphold a
money laundering conviction in United States v. Villarini, on
facts that were essentially analogous.101 However, no clear split
between the circuits emerged since the money laundering
convictions against Villarini were vacated on other grounds.102
Villarini, a former bank employee in Roanoke, Virginia, was
charged with embezzling $83,000 from her employer by
overstating the amount of mutilated cash she had under her
control during her employment, and then cashing out that
amount on her final day as a bank employee.103 After leaving
the bank, Villarini decamped for Florida so she could live near

99. Tencer, 107 F.3d at 1128.
100. In Tencer the court mentions Dobbs’s use of the funds “for family
and business expenses” several times but does specify its level of importance.
See Tencer, 107 F.3d at 1128-29.
101. Compare United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 2001),
with United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391, 393-94 (5th Cir. 1995).
102. See Villarini, 238 F.3d at 537 (concluding the government’s
evidence was sufficient to support money laundering convictions, but
vacating those convictions because the venue was improper).
103. Id. at 532.
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her daughter.104 After arriving in Florida, Villarini purchased a
cashier’s check to cover her moving expenses and opened a new
checking and savings accounts.105 Villarini made several small
deposits into the bank account over a two month period “to
cover her living expenses.”106
According to the Court:
the fact that Villarini did not deposit the entire
$83,000 in a single bank transaction, and instead
made four transactions, each involving less than
$3,000, at two-to-four week intervals, gives rise
to a reasonable inference that the transactions
were designed to avoid suspicion or to give the
appearance that she had a legitimate cash
income stream.107
As in Garcia-Emanuel, the court here once again noted that a
separate statutory provision exists to punish bank deposits
that are designed to avoid currency reporting requirements.108
However, the court cited Garcia-Emanuel to support its
conclusion that Villarini’s actions were sufficient to support her
money laundering conviction.109 In this instance, GarciaEmanuel may have been wrongly applied, and as a result, the
court may have erred in its conclusion that the evidence was
sufficient to characterize the transaction as money laundering
as opposed to money spending.110
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 533.
108. See id. at 532 (noting the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) is
to punish transactions to avoid currency reporting requirements). See also
United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994).
109. Villarini, 238 F.3d at 533 (citing Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d at 1478).
110. Villarini is thus clearly distinguishable from the bizarre case of
United States v. Dvorak, where a money laundering conviction was affirmed
solely on the basis of cash withdrawals that the defendant made from his
bank account. Compare Villarini, 238 F.3d at 530, with United States v.
Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017, 1021-24 (8th Cir. 2010). In Dvorak, the conviction
was affirmed on the grounds that several days after depositing fraudulent
checks, the defendant would withdraw the entire balance of the account in
cash in order to liquefy the funds so as to conceal their location. Dvorak, 617
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For example, Garcia-Emanuel is distinguishable from the
facts of Villarini because Garcia-Emanuel deposited the illegal
funds into his wife’s bank account, not his personal bank
account. In addition, in Garcia-Emanuel, the deposited funds
were subsequently used to purchase a single luxury item (a
Paso Fino horse) that could have either been an investment
and money laundering vehicle, or an item for personal use and
benefit. By contrast Villarini deposited funds into her personal
account to cover checks for her living expenses. The record does
not indicate whether Villarini was required to write checks for
her living expenses, such as rent or utility payments, but given
the prosecution’s burden of establishing guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the burden should have rested with the
prosecution to produce such evidence. In deciding Villarini, the
Fourth Circuit apparently ignored Garcia-Emanuel’s directive
to search for substantial evidence of an intent to conceal.111
Additionally the court in Villarini also failed to consider a
major theme of money laundering jurisprudence; namely that
money laundering is not the same thing as money spending. As
in Dobbs,112 Villarini’s transactions were as open and
transparent as banking transactions can be, and therefore, the
court should have found the evidence to be insufficient to
support a money laundering conviction.
In United States v. Shepard, the Tenth Circuit
dramatically expanded the scope of what evidence can be
sufficient to show that third-parties were used to launder
money by concealing the source of the illegal funds.113 Shepard
was a construction contractor convicted for his role in a scheme
to bill clients for non-existent employees and equipment.114 Two
of the money laundering counts Shepard was convicted of
involved the depositing of fraudulent checks into the bank
account of his daughter, Chastity Shepard.115 According to the

F.3d at 1024. Therefore, whether he spent the funds for personal use or not
was irrelevant to the court’s decision. Id.
111. See Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d at 1475.
112. See United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 1995).
113. See United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116, 1118-19 (10th Cir.
2005).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1122.
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court, this fact alone was sufficient to satisfy the statute’s
concealment requirement and characterize the transaction as
money laundering.116
In support of this proposition, the court cited United States
v. Short and United States v. Stephenson, in which deposits
made by a defendant’s wife into a safe deposit box were found
to be probative of an intent to conceal.117 Both cases are
distinguishable. For starters, both Short and Stephenson
involved the use of safe deposit boxes, which are inherently
more secretive, and subject to fewer reporting requirements,
than a bank account.118 Furthermore, in Short, the defendant
gave cash to his wife and instructed her to place the funds in a
safe deposit box “under the name of one of her relatives.”119
Therefore, the evidence in Short showed that the defendant put
several layers of disguise between himself and the illegal
funds, including holding the funds in a safe deposit box of
someone who presumably did not share his last name. In
Stephenson, the safe deposit box was placed in the name of the
defendant’s wife, so there were fewer layers of deception.120
However, all of the necessary probative evidence in Stephenson
was provided by the defendant who was recorded on a wire-tap
telling his wife to conceal the money by depositing it in the safe
deposit box.121
By contrast, in Shepard, the deposits were made into a
regular bank account, the account holder was the defendant’s
daughter who shared his last name, and there was no direct
evidence of an intent to conceal. The issue of a common last
name is important, because depositing funds into the account
of a spouse or child, without more, is generally insufficient to
support a conviction, while depositing funds into the account of
a girlfriend has been found to be sufficient.122 The facts of
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 1999)).
118. See Short, 181 F.3d at 626; Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 120.
119. Short, 181 F.3d at 626 (emphasis added).
120. Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 120.
121. Id.
122. Compare United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir.
2000) (“A design or intent to conceal the nature, the source, or the ownership
of unlawfully obtained proceeds may be inferred when a defendant transfers
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Shepard are simply not “substantial” evidence of
concealment.123 Under the facts of Shepard, where a deposit
was made in the bank account of an immediate family member
who shares the defendant’s last name, the government should
have been required to produce more evidence of an intent to
conceal in order to sustain the money laundering conviction.124
D. Missed Opportunities to Avoid the Characterization
Problem
In United States v. Richardson, the defendant was
convicted of money laundering for using the proceeds of her
boyfriend’s drug dealing operation to purchase a home in her
own name.125 According to the government, Richardson lied
about her income on a mortgage application and titled the
home in her name alone, even though she knew her boyfriend
Coles was the home’s true owner.126 In addition, the
government produced evidence that Coles laundered money
through a front business and engaged in an irregular series of
bank deposits in the days and hours before the closing of the
home purchase.127
However, the court also found there was “precious little
evidence” to show Richardson knew about structuring

those proceeds into the control of others with whom the defendant has a very
close relationship . . . . [I]n this case, the checking account of Mr. Bowman's
girlfriend.”), with United States v. Corchado-Peralta, 318 F.3d 255, 259 (1st
Cir. 2003) (“So far as we can tell, Corchado mostly did no more than make
large regular deposits in an account given to her by her husband; there was
no inference of concealment or disguise.”).
123. It should also be noted that Shepard endorsed the check in his own
name. United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005).
124. For example, in United States v. Warshak, a number of the charged
transactions involved transfers to the defendant, family members bearing his
surname, and to corporations in which defendant was the sole shareholder.
631 F.3d 266, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2010). However, the government also produced
evidence from an expert who found the transactions to be extremely
complicated and voluminous which had the effect of commingling and
concealing personal and business transactions. Id. at 321.
125. United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 2011).
126. Id. at 341-42.
127. Id.
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transactions that preceded the home purchase.128 In fact, only
one transaction–a deposit of $9200–could be connected to the
defendant.129 Further, uncontradicted evidence showed that
Richardson and Coles applied to have the home jointly titled in
both of their names, but were dissuaded from doing so by their
mortgage company who claimed they could not issue a loan to
Coles due to his poor credit, but that Richardson could qualify
on her own.130
Notably, although the prosecution introduced evidence
that five cash deposits of just less than $10,000 were made at
four different banks on the day of the closing,131 Richardson
was not charged with designing transactions to avoid bank
currency reporting requirements under 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii). Had Richardson been charged under this
provision of the statute, the prosecution could have avoided the
“characterization challenge” of this dual-purpose transaction,
and since the government had evidence linking Richardson to a
$9200 cash transaction, it is conceivable that they may have
been able to produce enough evidence to sustain a conviction on
this charge.
IV. Recommendations
Three recommendations stand out from the foregoing
analysis of cases that explore the difference between money
laundering and money spending. First, the bright light of direct
evidence, such as recorded conversations obtained through a
wiretap or the direct testimony of a co-conspirator, effectively
turns transactions that would otherwise exist in the grey area
between money spending and money laundering into clear-cut
black and white cases. Although direct evidence may be
difficult to obtain due to the budgetary or staff constraints,
there is a clear advantage to obtaining such evidence. This is
especially true for a prosecutor seeking a money laundering
conviction based on a dual-purpose transaction that evinces

128.
129.
130.
131.
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Id.
Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 341.
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elements of both legal money spending and illegal money
laundering.
Second, there appears to be a tendency on behalf of
prosecutors to charge suspects with money laundering under
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), but not with conducting a financial
transaction designed to avoid currency reporting requirements
under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).132 As noted throughout this article,
there have been several instances where defendants were not
charged with avoiding currency reporting requirements,
despite their apparently culpable conduct. Regardless of
whether prosecutors decided to pursue Richardson, Villarini,
and Garcia-Emanuel under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) for sentencing
purposes, or because of erroneous assumptions about the
evidence they would be allowed to present at trial, prosecutors
in future cases should ensure they make full use of currency
reporting requirements when charging suspects.
Third, when a money laundering charge requires
characterization of a dual-purpose transaction, courts have
been inclined, either explicitly or implicitly, to subject the
prosecution’s evidence to an exacting review. In some
instances, courts have articulated a “substantial evidence”
requirement for characterizing dual-purpose transactions as
money laundering. Although it is not entirely clear whether the
use of that term poses a distinct and additional legal burden on
the prosecution, or whether it is more of a rhetorical warning
that the evidence in such cases will be closely scrutinized, the
heightened focus is appropriate and should continue.
V. Conclusion
Money laundering is a relatively new crime that was
formerly codified for the first time in 1986. Although the
impetus for the new law was driven by public outrage at largescale money laundering operations of the mafia and foreign
drug cartels, the final law approved by Congress criminalized
money laundering regardless of its size or scale. As courts have
grappled with the statute’s language, a widespread consensus
132. See, e.g., Richardson, 658 F.3d at 333; United States v. GarciaEmanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994).
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has emerged that the law does not criminalize the mere
spending of the proceeds of illegal activity. However, there is
often a fine line between transactions that merely represent
money spending and money laundering transactions that
evince intent to conceal the illegal nature of the funds being
used in the transaction. The challenge is determining whether
the evidence demonstrates that such transactions were
undertaken with the requisite mens rea.
There are three ways this legal gray area can be brought
into sharper focus. First, prosecutors should focus on
developing direct evidence that demonstrates a defendant’s
intent to conceal. Second, prosecutors should ensure they make
full use of the currency reporting provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
1956. Finally, courts should continue to carefully scrutinize
money laundering charges that are based on dual-purpose
transactions to ensure money laundering convictions will only
stand where the defendant’s culpable conduct has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
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